Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is not a mere egology, but gets its concrete accomplishment only as a phenomenology of 'transcendental intersubjectivity'. However, the subjective centers of any transcendentality and thus of every constitution — even of intersubjectivity itself — have to be such unities as Leibniz' 'monads', that is, individually concrete subjects producing all their representations of one another completely out of themselves, respectively. Thus the problem arises, how the genuine transcendental status of each monadic subject in all its constitutive achievements (...) could be maintained so that they develop their own intentional lives in a universal mutual accordance, without presupposing again a supra-monadic ground for their 'harmony', i.e. a higher-levelled ordering unity. I shall argue that th peculiar Husserlian 'transcendental monadology' is inevitably bound to this intrinsic paradox which can at best be reduced to a mere postulate but never be resolved. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to analyze the basic tension in Kant's philosophy of right, i.e. within the conceptual framework of his Transcendental Idealism. Right as the embodiment of laws of freedom applicable to mortal-rational agents bridges the gap between their noumenal character and empirical-natural existence. How can this gap be bridged? A priori juridical laws are not sufficient to provide a complete classification for the empirical realm, exhausting all possible positive rights. Furthermore, according to Kant, Right must be basically (...) justifiable by reason. Yet this justification is merely a necessary condition for obligation. In order to develop any real obligation, it must be complemented by a non-deducible, empirical-positive aspect . Hence only as a result of actually exercising individual freedom does the mutual necessitation to recognize individual freedom for all arise. The historical-factual formation of civil social orders, though subject to a priori foundation, is thus unavoidably marked by contingency. Nonetheless, because of its a priori character, the idea of a society of free individuals becomes the standard of critique for every empirical instantiation of a civil social order. Recht als Inbegriff der Gesetze der Freiheit endlich-vernünftiger Subjekte leistet eine Vermittlung zwischen dem noumenalen Wesen und der emprisch-naturalen Existenz dieser Subjekte. Wie ist diese Vermittlung möglich? Eine vollständige Einteilung des Empirischen unter Rechtsgesetzen a priori ist unmöglich. Was Recht ist, ist nach Kant zwar nur in der Vernunft begründbar, aber dieser Grund bleibt nur notwendige Bedingung, zu der stets eine nicht deduzierbare, empirisch-positive Seite hinzukommen muß, um tatsächliche Verbindlichkeit zu erhalten : Erst aufgrund einer faktischen Ausübung der Freiheit entsteht die wechselseitige Nötigung, die individuelle Freiheit als Freiheit aller anzuerkennen. Die historisch-faktische Gestaltung von Rechtsgemeinschaften bleibt somit auch unter der Bedingung apriorischer Begründung mit unaufhebbarer Kontingenz behaftet; doch zugleich gewinnt die Idee einer Gemeinschaft freier Individuen kraft ihrer Apriorität eine kritische Funktion gegenüber jeglicher empirischer Instanz. (shrink)

In as far as every philosophy appears at a certain point in time it later inevitably becomes a historical fact. If its content is then to be recognizable, if it is to be reclaimed as philosophy in the present, then we ourselves must have a philosophical conception of history and, furthermore, a conception of philosophy's own historicity. Only since Kant has modern metaphysics expressly and methodically developed such a conception within its systematic claim to truth. Moreover, for the presentday philosophy (...) and its relationship to a completed metaphysics such a conception is indispensable - under the presupposition that the history of philosophy is to be taken seriously as philosophy. (shrink)

The intention of my comments is mainly to draw attention to a necessary distinction between that prereflective cogito of post‐metaphysical subjectivity that is analysed in Westphal's paper and the subject of the cogito that can be identified and verified as the very principle of modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, namely, as the subject of reason. This means first of all to step back from the conviction, taken as self‐evident, that the subject of reason — and thereby the truth claims (...) of that entire philosophical epoch — are illusionary, that is, without any right of their own. Instead we should be ready to ask how it is brought about philosophically that the subject is “shattered,” “humiliated,” “declared forfeit,” etc. My thesis is that post‐metaphysical subjectivity with its contaminated opacity can be made understandable in principle out of the endogenous crisis of the fully developed “absolute” subject of reason, if this crisis is carried out and decided as the transformation of the subject from its absolute to its decentered status. (shrink)

On November 21, 1994, Werner Marx passed away peacefully in the place he loved so well, his apartment in the Schloß in Bollschweil. Professor Marx was born in 1910 in Mulheim, Germany. He studied law and philosophy in Berlin, Freiburg, and Bonn before completing his state examination and doctorate in law in 1933. In the same year, he was removed from civil service and from an apprentice judgeship by the Nazis. After this, he emigrated first to Palestine and then in (...) 1938 to New York, where he took up academic studies again. After receiving an M.A. in economics, he completed the Ph.D. in philosophy, working with Kurt Reizler and Karl Löwith at the German University in Exile, later to become the New School for Social Research, and writing a dissertation on Aristotle’s ontology. During this period, he renewed his interest in Hegel and German Idealism, and also in Heidegger’s critique of the tradition and attempts to make “another beginning” in philosophy. Marx began teaching at the New School in 1949. After the appearance of his classic study, Heidegger and the Tradition, he was named successor to the Husserl-Heidegger chair in philosophy and director of Philosophical Seminar I in Freiburg, which he held from 1964 until his retirement in 1979. He also served as Director of the Husserl-Archives in Freiburg until his death. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung The Fischer controversy of the 1960s regarding the German Empire's responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War stands today as a pivotal debate for the question of whether the political culture of the Federal Republic has achieved a critical, self-reflexive view of contemporary German history. Drawing from Fischer's historiographic work back to his early academic activity as Protestant church historian an thereby also to understand the Fischer controversy as a debate regarding the responsibility of Protestantism for the (...) rise of National Socialism in Germany. (shrink)

Der Philosoph und Historiker Bernhard Groethuysen gehört zu den herausragenden Gestalten des deutsch-französischen Kulturtransfers der Zwischenkriegszeit. Zugleich gilt er aufgrund seiner historischen Schriften als einer der Wegbereiter der modernen Kultur- und Mentalitätsgeschichte. Erstmals liegt nun eine umfassende intellektuelle Biographie des Berliner Gelehrten und Pariser homme de lettres vor, die Groethuysens Leben und Werk miteinander in Verbindung setzt und im Kontext der europäischen Geistesgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts verortet. Ausgehend von seinem Studium bei Wilhelm Dilthey und Georg Simmel wird Groethuysens Lebensweg, der (...) ihn von der Berliner Universität in die Intellektuellenmilieus von Paris führte, nachgezeichnet. Bereits seit den frühen 1920er Jahren war die französische Hauptstadt zu Groethuysens Wahlheimat geworden. Hier verbrachte er den Großteil des Jahres, lebte im Freundeskreis von André Gide und machte als Lektor des bekannten französischen Verlags Gallimard Kafka und Musil in Frankreich bekannt. Zugleich war er bis 1933 während der Sommersemester als Professor für Philosophie an der Berliner Universität tätig. 1927 legte er mit seinem Werk über die Entstehung der bürgerlichen Welt- und Lebensanschauung in Frankreich einen Klassiker moderner Kulturgeschichtsschreibung vor, der sich als ein methodischer Brückenschlag zwischen französischer Mentalitätsgeschichte und deutscher Geistes- und Ideengeschichte lesen läßt. (shrink)

Describes the classicall law theory basics. Translaltion from German.

Mission-oriented climate change research is often unverifiable. Therefore, many stakeholders look to peer-reviewed climate change research for trustworthy information about deeply uncertain and impactful phenomena. This is because peer-review signals that research has been vetted for scientific standards like reproducibility and replicability. Here we evaluate the transparency of research methodologies in mission-oriented computational climate research. We find that only five percent of our sample meets the minimal standard of fully open data and code required for reproducibility and replicability. The widespread (...) lack of minimal openness standards in peer-reviewed climate change research jeopardizes scientific credibility and risks poor societal outcomes as we manage growing climate risks. The scientific community can and must do better. We, the authors, outline necessary openness standards that we commit to as researchers, reviewers, and readers. We invite you to join us. (shrink)

A pseudo-natural algorithm for the word problem of a finitely presented group is an algorithm which not only tells us whether or not a word w equals 1 in the group but also gives a derivation of 1 from w when w equals 1. In [13], [14] Madlener and Otto show that, if we measure complexity of a primitive recursive algorithm by its level in the Grzegorczyk hierarchy, there are groups in which a pseudo-natural algorithm is arbitrarily more complicated than (...) an algorithm which simply solves the word problem. In a given group the lowest degree of complexity that can be realised by a pseudo-natural algorithm is essentially the derivational complexity of that group. Thus the result separates the derivational complexity of the word problem of a finitely presented group from its intrinsic complexity. The proof given in [13] involves the construction of a finitely presented group G from a Turing machine T such that the intrinsic complexity of the word problem for G reflects the complexity of the halting problem of T, while the derivational complexity of the word problem for G reflects the runtime complexity of T. The proof of one of the crucial lemmas in [13] is only sketched, and part of the purpose of this paper is to give the full details of this proof. We will also obtain a variant of their proof, using modular machines rather than Turing machines. As for several other results, this simplifies the proofs considerably. MSC: 03D40, 20F10. (shrink)

Convergence research is driven by specific and compelling problems and requires deep integration across disciplines. The potential of convergence research is widely recognized, but questions remain about how to design, facilitate, and assess such research. Here we analyze a seven-year, twelve-million-dollar convergence project on sustainable climate risk management to answer two questions. First, what is the impact of a project-level emphasis on the values that motivate and tie convergence research to the compelling problems? Second, how does participation in convergence projects (...) shape the research of postdoctoral scholars who are still in the process of establishing themselves professionally? We use an interview-based approach to characterize what the project specifically enabled in each participant’s research. We find that (a) the project pushed participants’ research into better alignment with the motivating concept of convergence research and that this effect was stronger for postdoctoral scholars than for more senior faculty. (b) Postdocs’ self-assessed understanding of key project themes, however, appears unconnected to metrics of project participation, raising questions about training and integration. Regarding values, (c) the project enabled heightened attention to values in the research of a large minority of participants. (d) Participants strongly believe in the importance of explicitly reflecting on values that motivate and pervade scientific research, but they question their own understanding of how to put value-focused science into practice. This mismatch of perceived importance with poor understanding highlights an unmet need in the practice of convergence science. (shrink)

O ARTIGO INVESTIGA A PASSAGEM DO CAPÍTULO DA RELIGIÃO PARA O DO SABER ABSOLUTO NA FENOMENOLOGIA DO ESPÍRITO DE HEGEL. TRATA-SE DE LOCALIZAR A RELIGIÃO COMO TRADUÇÃO DA FORMA OU DA LINGUAGEM DA REPRESENTAÇÃO PARA A FORMA OU A LINGUAGEM DO CONCEITO E AS IMPLICAÇÕES QUE ESSA DETERMINAÇÃO FORMAL TRAZ PARA UMA POSSÍVEL COMPREENSÃO DO LUGAR ESPECÍFICO DO DISCURSO RELIGIOSO, QUE SE MOVE ENTRE O UNIVERSAL E O PARTICULAR.